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Abstract: Aircraft maintenance includes all the tasks needed to ensure an aircraft’s continuing
airworthiness. Accidents that result from these maintenance activities can be used to assess safety.
This research seeks to undertake a preliminary investigation of accidents that have maintenance
contributions. An exploratory design was utilized, which commenced with a content analysis of the
accidents with maintenance contributions (n = 35) in the official ICAO accident data set (N = 1277),
followed by a quantitative ex-post facto study. Results showed that maintenance contributions are
involved in 2.8 ± 0.9% of ICAO official accidents. Maintenance accidents were also found to be
more likely to have one or more fatalities (20%), compared to all ICAO official accidents (14.7%).
The number of accidents with maintenance contributions per year was also found to have reduced
over the period of the study; this rate was statistically significantly greater than for all accidents
(5%/year, relative to 2%/year). Results showed that aircraft between 10 and 20 years old were most
commonly involved in accidents with maintenance contributions, while aircraft older than 18 years
were more likely to result in a hull loss, and aircraft older than 34 years were more likely to result in
a fatality.
Keywords: accidents; aircraft; airworthiness; aviation; maintenance; safety
1. Introduction
Aircraft maintenance can be described as activities performed to maintain an aircraft in a
serviceable and airworthy condition. ‘Maintenance’ includes activities involving component or
aircraft repair, inspection, overhauling, troubleshooting, and modifications [1–3]. Aircraft maintenance
is a critical task that is essential for warranting aviation safety in relation to the life-cycle of an
aircraft [4–6]. Even though maintenance is regarded as one of aviation’s many high-risk areas due
to its direct impact on aviation safety, it still has a considerable contribution in aircraft maintenance
accident and incident occurrences [7–10]. Hobbs and Williamson [11] and Floyd [12] highlight the
importance of understanding maintenance errors along with promoting a culture of identifying,
reporting, and learning from maintenance errors for improving work quality and safety.
PeriyarSelvam, et al. [13] reports that maintenance costs typically make up between 10% and 20%
of aircraft operational costs. The Airline Maintenance Cost Executive Commentary is published by
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International Air Transport Association’s Maintenance Cost Technical Group, contains annual data
acquired from airlines around the world. These data are based on the airline’s maintenance cost
data. Data collected from 54 airlines for 2018 shows that the airlines spent USD 69 billion on aircraft
maintenance, repair, and overhaul. This represented approximately 9% of the total airline operational
costs [14].
The general aim of this work is to help improve safety in scheduled commercial air transport;
this will be achieved by understanding how accidents with maintenance contributions are unique
in contrast to all other scheduled commercial air transport accidents. The knowledge gained from
understanding these features of accidents with maintenance contributions will hopefully prevent
further accidents, and hence, save lives and reduce the cost (both direct and indirect) to the aviation
industry. The research questions addressed by this work include:
1. How many accidents in the ICAO official accident dataset are contributed to by maintenance
factors, and by extension, what proportion of ICAO official accidents have a maintenance
contribution? (RQ1)
2. How does the distribution of accidents that show a contribution from maintenance activities
differ to all scheduled commercial air transport accidents, reported by ICAO? (RQ2)
3. Has the number of ‘official’ accidents with maintenance contributions reduced over time? (RQ3)
4. How does the age of an aircraft in an ‘official’ accident with maintenance contributions influence
the outcome (fatalness and aircraft damage) of the occurrence? (RQ4)
In response to these research questions, the following research hypotheses were proposed:
1. There is currently no reported number for the proportion of accidents that have maintenance as a
contributing factor. Estimates for air traffic management accidents are on the order of 8%, hence a
similar single digit percentage would be reasonable to expect.
2. Accidents with maintenance contributions will show unique features in comparison to all aviation
accidents; occurrences will typically be categorized as system component failures, and they will
be more common in earlier phases of flight.
3. Given the short timeframe of the ICAO official accident dataset (since 2008), it is anticipated that
the number of events will have remained constant over time, potentially with a slight reduction.
4. Older aircraft will be more likely to result in fatalities and hull losses.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Aircraft Maintenance Related Safety Occurrences in General Aviation
Nelson and Goldman [15] presented research on maintenance related accident investigations
for general aviation aircrafts and home built aircrafts, reports for a period between 1983 and 2001
obtained from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). All maintenance related accidents
were divided into two databases one for amateur built aircraft and the other for GA. The databases were
further analyzed as per human factors taxonomy of maintenance related casual factors. The reports
were analyzed to establish the frequencies of fatalities and injuries, airframe time, phase of operation,
and time since last inspection. The report further compared the taxonomy results of maintenance
related casual factors for amateur built aircraft to general aviation maintenance related accidents.
The research findings showed that the main cause of the maintenance related accidents in both amateur
built aircraft and general aviation aircraft are due to installation of aircraft parts, at 32% and 17%
respectively. Hence, maintenance considered as a causal accident factor, is approximately six times more
likely to result in a fatal outcome in amateur built aircrafts as compared to general aircraft accidents.
Studies for analyzing maintenance related safety occurrences were carried out by Rashid et al. [16]
and Saleh et al. [17]. The human factor analysis of both studies revealed that the most contributing
factor towards maintenance incidents are associated with improper procedures being followed for
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inspections and installation of components, along with casual factors that are deeply rooted within
the organizational and managerial levels. Rashid, Place, and Braithwaite [16] statistically and on a
human factor basis analyzed 58 helicopter maintenance-induced safety occurrences. Data was acquired
from incidents reports obtained from the Australia Transport Safety Bureau, TSB of Canada, CAA of
New Zealand, the UK’s AAIB, and the USA’s NTSB. Saleh, Tikayat Ray, Zhang, and Churchwell [17],
presented risk factor-based research findings focused on maintenance and inspection of helicopter
accidents tracing the time for when the error was committed to the actual time when the accident took
place. The study showed that about 31% of maintenance related accidents occurred within the first
10 flight hours. It also revealed that most of the preventive maintenance activities errors occurred due
to nonconformance with published regulations or maintenance plans. The study recommended the
providence of better training; emphasis on the development, use, and implementation of checklists;
and strong awareness of the importance of safety along with isolation of workload from maintainers.
2.2. Aircraft Maintenance Related Safety Occurrences in Commercial Air Transport
Several studies have been conducted to understand the reasons behind maintenance related safety
occurrences for promoting better safety culture in the commercial air transport sector. Research findings
based on studies carried out by Suzuki et al. [18], Insley and Turkoglu [7] and Geibel et al. [19] revealed
that the main causes of maintenance occurrences are due to inadequate maintenance procedures, lack
of responsibility, and incorrect installations.
Insley and Turkoglu [7] presented a study based on enhancing the understanding of the safety
critical functions related to the nature of aircraft maintenance-related accidents and serious incidents,
between 2003 and 2017. For the selected time period it was found that runway excursions, air turnback’s,
and on-ground gear-related events were the most common maintenance events while most of the
system/component failures related to engine, landing gear, and flight controls. The data related to fatal
accidents revealed collision events, engine-related events, and inadequate maintenance procedures
were the most concerning maintenance factor. Similar results were observed by Suzuki, von Thaden,
and Geibel [18] based on data collected for 1000 incidents centered on coordination problems in
commercial aircraft maintenance from NASA’s Aviation Safety Report System (ARSR) for a period of
two years from August 2004–July 2006. This study revealed that three problematic behaviors—not
delivering information, sending wrong information, and lack of responsibility—are potential sources
of impairment for safety procedures in aircraft maintenance. Geibel, von Thaden, and Suzuki [19],
presented study results by analyzing issues that cause errors in airline maintenance. Technician
qualifications, inspections, parts installation, contract maintenance issues, and log book documentation
were the five main categories identified as high-profile performance-based error categories for the
study based on 1000 incident reports identified for aircraft maintenance related issues from NASA
ASRS for a time period from July 1997 through August 2006. The study concluded over that over
53% of the undesirable outcomes analyzed in the ASRS data were attributed to skill-based errors,
such as slips, lapses, and perceptual errors, followed by routine violations (15%), and decision-making
errors (9%).
A study based on the impact of human factors training for maintenance personnel to reduce
maintenance incidents in the European Union and the United States was carried out by Reynolds et
al. [20]. Data regarding the subject training was compared prior to the implementation of the human
factors training, 1991–1998 and after the implementation of the subject training, 2000–2006. The study
revealed that following the introduction of human factors training the mechanical incidents in the EU
dropped from 33% to 22% while the percentage of mechanical incidents in the United States increased
resulting in a significant statistical difference in rates for the US relative to the EU. Further a study
conducted by Ng and Li [21] provides theoretically supported concepts aimed to provide assistance in
analyzing aircraft maintenance incidents. The study investigated the causes of 109 aircraft maintenance
incidents for which data was acquired from various airline companies. The results revealed that
more than 60% of the aircraft maintenance tasks could be categorized as rule-based tasks as per the
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Rasmussen’s SRK framework while almost “50% of the incidents can be explained by well-known
error types or work factors in the psychological literature”.
2.3. Aircraft Maintenance Related Safety Occurrences in Military Aviation
Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) was used by Schmidt et al. [22] and
Illankoon, Tretten, and Kumar [8] to analyze maintenance mishaps in military aviation. Schmidt,
Schmorrow, and Figlock [22] carried out analyses of the influence of human factors on naval aviation
maintenance mishaps. Information for a total of 470 maintenance related mishaps was gained from the
Naval Safety Center’s Information Management Systems for the fiscal years, 1990–1997. The study
revealed that supervisory, maintainer, and working latent conditions are present that can impact
maintainers in the performance of their jobs. Illankoon, Tretten, and Kumar [8] analyzed data
acquired from a fighter aircraft fleet looking for reported maintenance deviations over a period of
38 months beginning from January 2013, using HFAC-ME (Maintenance Extension) taxonomy to
find and mark hidden causal factors. The study identifies attention, memory errors, inadequacy of
processes, and documentation as key causal factors. The study also provides insight on how situational
awareness (SA) interventions may contribute to the reduction of maintenance deviations while at the
same time capture hidden causal factors.
2.4. Research Gap
There is a clear difference in specific results in the previous studies, along with similarities. These
differences depending on data sets used and are likely real features of the corresponding populations.
Previous work has looked at collections of all safety occurrences (accidents and incidents), subsets (just
incidents etc.), and applications to specific segments of the aviation industry (GA, etc.). Given that the
annual ICAO Safety Reports are published by the international body for air transport, it is important to
understand accidents with maintenance contributions in this specific data set. Not only can statistically
significant features be identified, trends over time can be analyzed to show how accidents with
maintenance contributions in scheduled commercial air transport operations, utilizing large transport
category aircraft, have evolved.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Research Design
This study utilized a mixed method approach, specifically an exploratory design, commencing
with a qualitative content analysis to provide data for a quantitative ex-post facto study [23]. In this
approach, the categorical data from the accidents with maintenance contributions were extracted,
and then the narratives were coded further to generate additional categorical variables. Once the data
was coded, it was then analyzed in an ex-post facto study, to analyze the distributions in comparison
to all aviation accidents to assess if any observed differences were statistically significant.
3.2. Data Collection, Coding, and Cleaning
The primary source of data for this work was the set of ICAO official accidents [24]. This list
of official accidents includes those used in the ICAO annual safety reports and is made up of all
safety occurrences that are accidents, in a scheduled commercial operation, and investigated by
the relevant national authority. Entries in the ICAO official accident dataset were cross referenced
with the Aviation Safety Network (ASN) to provide narratives for the accidents with maintenance
contributions. While the ASN database (provided by the Flight Safety Foundation [25]) includes
maintenance as one of the contributing/causal factors (of which there are almost 100 cases), full text
narrative searches of all entries in the ASN were undertaken. Advanced searches in both Google and
Bing were conducted to the extent of the search engines, including omitted duplicates. The searches
used criteria that limited the website searched (using “site:”, to the ASN database) and the title of
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the results (using “intitle:”, and “ASN Aircraft accident”). The additional search terms then used
were “maintenance”, “mechanic”, “technician”, electrician”, “AME” (aircraft maintenance engineer),
“LAME” (licensed aircraft maintenance engineer), “incorrect installation”, “incorrectly installed”,
“inadequate inspection”, “airworthiness directive”, “service bulletin”, and “inadequate maintenance”.
The general term “maintenance” was used last, as it returned the most results, and many of the cases
were returned with the other more specific search terms, and hence if already selected were identifiable
due to the hyperlink’s color change.
Using the details and narratives from the ASN, the 35 ICAO official accidents were coded with:
• Maintenance issue,
• Type of operation,
• Operator’s business model,
• Phase of flight (in which the maintenance issue first appeared)
• Age (difference between year of the aircraft’s first flight and the year of the accident),
• Accident category (A1 a hull loss, or A2 repairable), and
• ICAO occurrence categories.
The maintenance issues used by ASN to code these accidents include:
• Repair of previous damage,
• Engine issue,
• Failure to follow airworthiness directives or service bulletins,
• Wrong or incorrect installation of parts, and
• General issues (substandard practices etc).
The ICAO data already includes the number and type of engines. The range of mass categories
used in the ICAO official accident dataset was insufficient, so a lookup-table was created for all the
aircraft (1277, removing duplicates), including the weight (MTOW) and manufacturer (manufacturer
was coded as the current active company responsible for the type, e.g., the DHC-8 is coded as
Bombardier). These codes were then added to the records for all the accidents (not just the maintenance
accidents). Another lookup-table was created for all the three-letter country codes, to give continent
and ICAO region. These were used to code the region of the accident and the region of the operator.
The final data set utilized the downloaded spreadsheet from ICAO [24]. Additional columns
were added to this spreadsheet; including: MTOW, manufacturer, the operator’s business model
and the type of operation, the two regions (operator and occurrence), the phase of flight where the
maintenance issue occurred, the date separated (day, month, and year), the year of first flight (and then
the difference between that and year of accident giving the aircraft age), the identified maintenance
issue (and associated system and sub-system), and the separated occurrence categories (downloaded
as a single comma separated text string for each accident) giving a sample size of 60 due to the fact that
accidents can be coded with multiple categories.
3.3. Data Analysis
3.3.1. Non-Parametric Analysis
For RQ2, given the small sample size, 35 accidents with maintenance contributions, testing was
limited to utilizing Fisher’s exact test [26]. This type of testing with small sample sizes has previously
been utilized in other post-accident analyses [27]; as with that work, Fisher’s exact tests were undertaken
in MATLAB to determine the p-values. Specifically, in the testing of the various characteristics or
features coded, the observed (O) data were the 35 accidents with maintenance contributions, while the
expected (E) are those of the complete set of 1277 official accidents. The statistical hypotheses to be
tested are given as
H0: PO,n = PE,n
HA: PO,n , PE,n
Aerospace 2020, 7, 129 6 of 21
where P is the proportion of the n’th category. That is, n separate Fisher’s exact tests were conducted.
3.3.2. Longitudinal Analysis
For RQ3, correlation was used to determine if any statistically significant trend existed over the
12 years of the study. Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) is a measure of association between two
interval or ratio variables. In this case, the number of accidents and the year. The statistical hypotheses
to be tested are given as
H0: r = 0
HA: r , 0
This test is assessing if there is an association between the number of accidents in each year and
the year. A secondary question can be posed here, and that is, if the accident counts have reduced,
has the rate of reduction for maintenance accidents reduced at the same rate or a different rate to all
accidents? This requires two simple linear models
nall = α1 + β1t (1)
and
nm = α2 + β2t (2)
where α1 and β1 are the model coefficients to predict the count for all official ICAO accidents (nall),
while α2 and β2 are the model coefficients to predict the counts for accidents with maintenance
contributions (nm), and t is time in years. Assessing the difference in the rate of change requires a
combined model, given as
n∆ = nm − pnall = α3 + β3t (3)
where the new ‘dependent variable’ is given as the relative difference in the two accident groups (p is
the proportion of all accidents which are maintenance related and approximately 35/1277). That is,
multiplying nall by p gives a count relative to 35 instead of 1277, which means they are on the same
scale. If this new count, or more correctly, the difference in the count (n∆), diverges (β3 , 0), then the
rates are not equal (β1 , β2). These can be expressed as
H0: β3 = 0 or β1 = β2
HA: β3 , 0 or β1 , β2
A subtle difference which needs to be mentioned is that since two dependent variables are being
regressed against the independent variable, then the degrees of freedom are the number of observations
(12) subtract 3, not the 2 associated with simple linear regression.
Logistic regression is needed to answer RQ4. This is because both fatalness and fate of the airframe
(accident category) are both dichotomous variables (fatal or not, hull lost, or not), while the aircraft
age is a continuous variable. Logistic regression is the ideal tool to measure association between a
dichotomous dependent variable and a continuous independent variable. The statistical hypotheses to
be tested are given as
H0: β = 0
HA: β , 0
whereβ is the variable in the fitted logit function, that relates the continuous variable to the dichotomous
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Here, π is the estimated probability of the dichotomous outcome at the given predictor level (x),
in this case, age of the aircraft.
4. Non-Parametric Results and Analysis
4.1. Summary of Results
Table 1 shows the results for the Fisher’s exact tests comparing accidents with maintenance
contributions to all accidents in the ICAO official accident data set. The characteristics that are
statistically significant include region of occurrence (ROc), phase of flight (PoF), occurrence categories
(OC), and manufacturer (Manu). The characteristics which were not statistically significant are the
fatalness (Fat), region of operator (ROp), maximum takeoff mass (Mass), engine types (ET), and number
of engines (nE). Table 2 shows the Fisher’s exact test results for those characteristics which were
tested against a uniform expected distribution. Here, all but the operator’s business model (BM) were
statistically significant; including, maintenance issue (MI), system/component issue (SC), the type of
operation (Op), and the age of the aircraft at the time of the accident in decades (Age). Each of these
characteristics will be discussed further below.
Table 1. Fisher’s exact test, comparing characteristics of accidents with maintenance contributions to
all accidents, in the ICAO official accident data set.
Fat ROp ROc PoF OC Manu Mass ET nE
p 0.28 0.58 0.04 0.03 ~0 0.02 0.93 0.84 0.59
Conc N N Y Y Y Y N N N
Table 2. Fisher’s exact test, to determine if characteristics of accidents with maintenance contributions
are different to an expected uniform distribution.
MI SC Gear BM Op Age
p 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.31 0.02 0.03
Conc Y Y N N Y Y
4.2. Comparative Data
4.2.1. Fatalness
Figure 1 shows the distribution of fatal to non-fatal accidents. For all the official ICAO accidents,
14.7% resulted in at least one fatality. For accidents with maintenance contributions this increased
to 20%. As noted in Section 4.1, this difference is not statistically significant. The lack of statistical
significance is due to the comparatively small sample size. That is, more than 1277 accidents have
occurred in the aviation industry since 2008. However, specific criteria need to be met for an accident
such that it is included in the ICAO official statistics. Of this population, the resultant sample of
accidents with maintenance contributions that are fatal is too small to draw definitive conclusions.
The conclusion of interest being that accidents with maintenance contributions appear to be more fatal
than the ‘average’ accident. Further work is needed to confirm this conclusion.
Aerospace 2020, 7, 129 8 of 21
Aerospace 2020, 7, x FOR PEER REVIEW 7 of 21 
 
categories (OC), and manufacturer (Manu). The characteristics which were not statistically significant 
are the fatalness (Fat), region of operator (ROp), maximum takeoff mass (Mass), engine types (ET), 
and number of engines (nE). Table 2 shows the Fisher’s exact test results for those characteristics 
which were tested against a uniform expected distribution. Here, all but the operator’s business 
model (BM) were statistically significant; including, maintenance issue (MI), system/component issue 
(SC), the type of operation (Op), and the age of the aircraft at the time of the accident in decades 
(Age). Each of these characteristics will be discussed further below. 
Table 1. Fisher’s exact test, comparing characteristics of accidents with maintenance contributions to 
all accidents, in the ICAO official accident data set 
 Fat ROp ROc PoF OC Manu Mass ET nE 
p 0.28 0.58 0.04 0.03 ~0 0.02 0.93 0.84 0.59 
Conc N N Y Y Y Y N N N 
Table 2. Fisher’s exact test, to determine if characteristics of accidents with maintenance contributions 
are different to an expected uniform distribution 
 MI SC Gear BM Op Age 
p 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.31 0.02 0.03 
Conc Y Y N N Y Y 
4.2. Comparative Data 
4.2.1. Fatalness 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of fatal to non-fatal accidents. For all the official ICAO accidents, 
14.7% resulted in at least one fatality. For accidents with maintenance contributions this increased to 
20%. As noted in Section 4.1, this difference is not statistically significant. The lack of statistical 
significance is due to the comparatively small sample size. That is, more than 1277 accidents have 
occurred in the aviation industry since 2008. However, specific criteria need to be met for an accident 
such that it is included in the ICAO official statistics. Of this population, the resultant sample of 
accidents with maintenance contributions that are fatal is too small to draw definitive conclusions. 
The conclusion of interest being that accidents with maintenance contributions appear to be more 
fatal than the ‘average’ accident. Further work is needed to confirm this conclusion. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of fatalness for accidents with maintenance contributions. 
4.2.2. World Region 
While it might be worth considering an expected distribution for a region based on traffic 
numbers, comparing the distribution of regions for accidents with a maintenance contribution to the 
distribution of regions for all accidents removes sampling bias. That is, different countries may have 
different levels of reliability when it comes to ensuring relevant aviation accidents are shared with 
ICAO. By comparing a distribution of accidents to another distribution of accidents, this potential 
Figure 1. istribution of fatalness for accidents ith aintenance contributions.
4.2.2. World Region
While it might be worth considering an expected distribution for a region based on traffic numbers,
comparing the distribution of regions for accidents with a maintenance contribution to the distribution
of regions for all accidents removes sampling bias. That is, different countries may have different
levels of reliability when it comes to ensuring relevant aviation accidents are shared with ICAO.
By comparing a distribution of accidents to another distribution of accidents, this potential bias is
removed. This is because in principle a country should be as likely to report an accident with a
maintenance contribution as any other accident. Region is coded as both the region of the operator,
and the region in which the accident occurred. Figure 2a shows the region of the operator (ROp) which
was not statistically significant in Section 4.1. There is, however, a noticeable lack of North American
maintenance accidents, with the Middle East and South and Latin America having slightly more than
expected. Figure 2b shows the distribution of accidents for the region in which those accidents occurred
(ROc). A similar trend can be seen, but more pronounced, hence the reason this test in Section 4.1 was
statistically significant. The interesting result here is the spike for the Middle East. Looking at these
cases there are no accidents associated with the big three Middle Eastern airlines (Emirates, Etihad,
and Qatar); the cases are two Iranian, a Sudanese, and a charted aircraft operating for Saudi Arabia.
The other noteworthy difference is the lack of accidents in Africa; previous work looking at human
factors (HF) related accidents showed a greater prevalence of these accidents in Africa [28].
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4.2.3. Phase of Flight
Figure 3 shows the distribution of accidents with maintenance contributions by phase of flight.
The reason for recoding the phase of flight from the original ICAO codes is that a number of maintenance
related issues manifest themselves prior to causing ‘the accident’. For example, gear related issues
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manifest themselves at takeoff (gear up) or approach (gear down), but the ‘accident’ is considered to
have occurred upon landing. When the phase of flight as coded by ICAO was utilized (Figure 3a),
no statistically significant result is observed (not included in Section 4.1), although there is a slight
excess of landing accidents, again expected by the fact that maintenance issues are most commonly
associated with the landing gear. When recoded (Figure 3b), the results are statistically significantly
different (as shown in Section 4.1). As hypothesized, there are more accidents during climb; however,
there is no increase during takeoff. Again, during climb (ICL) is when the gear is retracted, and this
spike corresponds to these failures occurring at that time.
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Figure 3. Distribution of phase of flight for accidents with maintenance contributions: (a) the phase in 
which the accident occurred (end result); (b) the phase in which the maintenance issue manifested. 
i . i t i ti f f fli t f i t it i t ce c tri tions: ( ) t i
ic t e acci e t occ rred (end result); (b) the phase in which the maintenance is ue manifested.
4.2.4. Occurrence Category
Any occurrence category that resulted in less than 5% of the total were grouped into an ‘other’
category. The results showing the associated occurrence categories in Figure 4 are not surprising,
with system component failure non-powerplant (SCF-NP) the most common, followed by system
component failure powerplant (SCF-PP). While in the ICAO official accident statistics SCF are common,
they are more common in accidents with maintenance contributions. The increase in SCF occurrences
is balanced by slightly less than expected abnormal runway contact (ARC) and runway excursions
(RE); more significant is the lack of ‘other’ for accidents with maintenance contributions, and the fact
that ‘other’ for ICAO official accidents includes turbulence (TURB) which is second most common
cause in the ICAO official accident statistics.
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The distribution of accidents by manufacturer is shown in Figure 5. The mode for both distributions
is clearly Boeing, which is expected based on the number of Boeing, McDonnell, and Douglas aircraft
that have been in operation between 2008 and 2019. There are, however, fewer Airbus accidents with
maintenance contributions relative to all official accidents. The key significant difference is for Ilyushin
aircraft, where the percentage of maintenance accidents is 10 times the percentage of all accidents.
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This result mirrors previous research into human factors accidents [28], where accidents with Russian
aircraft were more likely to be involved in those accidents. Interestingly, Antonov had no maintenance
accidents while it had 43 other accidents in the ICAO official data set.
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4.2.6. Mass Category
The ICAO Accident/Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) taxonomies code aircraft size as the mass
category. These include maximum takeoff masses of (1) less than 2.25 tonnes, (2) 2.25 tonnes to
5.7 tonnes, (3) 5.7 tonnes to 27 tonnes, (4) 27 tonnes to 272 tonnes, and (5) above 272 tonnes. Given
ICAO Official Accidents only include aircraft above 5.7 tonnes, the first two categories were omitted
in the results. The distribution of accidents by mass category is shown in Figure 6. The mode is 3
(medium aircraft), and this mass category includes the majority of narrow body (single isle) large
transport category aircraft, and the smaller wide body (twin isle) large transport category aircraft.
The distributions are almost identical, and the test result was not statistically significant.
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4.2.8. Maintenance Issue 
From Figure 8a, ‘general’ (substandard practices, insufficient maintenance, qualification, 
training, etc.) has the highest count, and the observed variation is statistically significant. Engine and 
part issues are as expected, while ‘AD/SB’ (failure to follow airworthiness directives or service 
bulletins) and ‘PD’ (repaired previous damage), have low counts. Figure 8b shows the distribution 
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4.2.7. Engines
The ICAO ADREP taxonomies use multiple categories to differentiate the most common engine
types used on aircraft. However, the ICAO official accidents code engines as reciprocating (piston),
turboprop, and jet (which captures turbofan and turbojet engines). From Figure 7a, the most common
engine in accidents (both maintenance and all) is jet. For the number of engines, Figure 7b, a twin
engine aircraft is typically involved in accidents. This is because twin engine aircraft are the most
common. For both engine type and engine count, there was no statistically significant difference
between all accidents and those with maintenance contributions.
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4.2.8. Maintenance Issue 
From Figure 8a, ‘general’ (substandard practices, insufficient maintenance, qualification, 
training, etc.) has the highest count, and the observed variation is statistically significant. Engine and 
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4.2.8. Maintenance Issue
From Figure 8a, ‘general’ (substandard practices, insufficient maintenance, qualification, training,
etc.) has the highest count, and the observed variation is statistically significant. Engine and part issues
are as expected, while ‘AD/SB’ (failure to follow airworthiness directives or service bulletins) and ‘PD’
(repaired previous damage), have low counts. Figure 8b shows the distribution of system/component
involved in accidents with maintenance contributions. The statistically significant result indicates
that the landing gear is involved in 47% of accidents, with engine is in 26%. Given the unexpectedly
high count for gear related issues, a further sub-code of gear issue was created for these 16 accidents
(Figure 8c) where mechanical/structural/physical issues were identified as the most common.
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4.2.9. Operator and Operation
While in Figure 9a, there is a spike for FSNCs, this is not statistically significant. In fact, if we
compare to a previous study that investigated business models in HF accidents [28], the distribution
of accidents with maintenance contributions has a similar shape, and hence with a limited sample
size, this would also not produce a statistically significant result. For the type of operation or service,
the result is statistically significant, with the peak value for domestic and the minimum value for
charter responsible for this. It should be noted that ICAO indicates globally that 60% of revenue
passenger kilometers are currently international [29], leaving 40% for domestic (including regional).
However, we can clearly see that accidents with maintenance contributions are more likely to occur in
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5. Parametric Results and Analysis
5.1. Longitudinal Study
Table 3 shows the results for the various correlation and regression tests. The variables tested
included:
1. ICAO, the total number of ICAO official accidents,
2. M, the number of ICAO official accidents with maintenance contributions,
3. M%, the percentage of accidents with maintenance contributions relative to all ICAO
official accidents,
4. pICAO, the proportion of ICAO official accidents (relative to 2008),
5. pM, the proportion of accidents with maintenance contributions (relative to 2008), and
6. The model given by (3) above.
Table 3. Correlation and regression test results for the various longitudinal factors.
ICAO M M% pICAO pM Model
β −2.77 −0.29 −0.14 −0.02 −0.05 −0.21
r2 0.24 0.42 0.10 0.24 0.42 0.22
n 12 12 12 12 12 12
v 10 10 10 10 10 9
t 5.58 8.45 3.29 5.58 8.45 4.73
p <0.01 <0.01 0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Sig Y Y Y Y Y Y
All of the tests were statistically significant. The results for the proportions match the respective
raw count results, which is to be expected. However, the proportion results enable the β values to be
directly compared, since they are relative counts. We note that maintenance accidents appear to have
reduced over time 2.5 times faster than the rate of reduction in all ICAO official accidents. The statistical
significance of this is supported by the results for the model given by (3). Figure 11 shows the annual
accident counts for the accidents with maintenance contributions and all of the ICAO official accidents.
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5.2. Logistic Regression Results
Research question 4 (RQ4) was posed to test the hypothesis that older aircraft are ‘more dangerous’
than newer aircraft. Clearly the context of this statement is only with regards to those accidents with a
maintenance contribution. The two aspects here (fatalness and aircraft damage) and their relationship
to age can be assessed with logistic regression. Figure 12a shows the resultant logit fitted to the fatalness
data (0 = non-fatal, 1 = fatal), and the logit predicts that older aircraft are statistically significantly
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more likely to be associated with a fatality (McFadden’s pseudo R2 = 0.11, χ2 = 3.97, p = 0.046); to be
clear, this is just statistically significant, and the R2 suggests only 11% in the variation of fatalness is
due to the age of the aircraft, and the odds are even for an aircraft that is 34 years old. The limitation
here is the small sample size, giving only a few fatal outcomes. Looking at the outcome for the aircraft
(Figure 12b), the logit now much more clearly increases with age as hypothesized (McFadden’s pseudo
R2 = 0.30, χ2 = 14.6, p <0.01). That is, about 30% of the variation in the aircraft damage outcome is






Figure 12. Results for the logistic regression investigating the effect of aircraft age on: (a) fatalness of 
maintenance accidents (0 = no fatalities, 1 = fatalities); (b) aircraft damage from maintenance accidents 
(0 = aircraft repaired, 1 = aircraft damaged beyond repair = hull loss). 
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“precise statistics are unavailable” for the proportion of aviation accidents and incidents that are the 
result of improper maintenance. This is the inspiration for RQ1. While it would also be interesting to 
know the proportion of aviation incidents that have a maintenance contribution or causation, the 
ICAO official accident data is exactly that, only accident data. We have a database that contains n 
number of accidents each year, and we have a dataset that contains m number of accidents with 
maintenance contributions each year. Figure 13 shows this annual percentage of ICAO official 
accidents which have maintenance contributions. 
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the average, (2.8 ± 0.9%). 
Annually, the average percentage of accidents with maintenance contributions is given as (2.8 ± 
0.9%). However, the result of the regression test for this was statistically significant, in terms of a 
reduction by 0.14% per year. That is, on average, this percentage is reducing by 1 every 7 years. The 
peak in 2016, and then the lack of an accident in 2019 suggests this reducing trend is an artifact of the 
small sample size. To conclude, approximately 3% of accidents are the result of aircraft maintenance. 
6. Case Study 
6.1. Rational 
The results of the quantitative analysis produce findings that lack of context. While a trend over 
time can be shown to be statistically significant, further questions involving question of ‘why’ cannot 
be answered. Using the results of the quantitative analysis, a ‘typical’ case, however, can be identified. 
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5.3. Aircraft Maintenance Fraction
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s report into HF in aircraft maintenance [31] states that
“precise statistics are unavailable” for the proportion of aviation accidents and incidents that are the
result of improper maintenance. This is the inspiration for RQ1. While it would also be interesting to
know the proportion of aviation incidents that have a maintenance contribution or causation, the ICAO
official accident data is exactly that, only accident data. We have a database that contains n number of
accidents each year, and we have a dataset that contains m number of accidents with maintenance
contributions each year. Figure 13 shows this annual percentage of ICAO official accidents which have
maintenance contributions.
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Figure 13. Percentage of all accidents in the IC official accident data set that have been identified
with a maintenance contribution, 2008 to 2019. The shaded band illustrates the confidence interval of
the average, (2.8 ± . ).
Annually, the average percentage of accidents with maintenance contributions is given as
(2.8 ± 0.9%). However, the result of the regression test for this was statistically significant, in terms
of a reduction by 0.14% per year. That is, on average, this percentage is reducing by 1 every 7 years.
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The peak in 2016, and then the lack of an accident in 2019 suggests this reducing trend is an artifact of
the small sample size. To conclude, approximately 3% of accidents are the result of aircraft maintenance.
6. Case Study
6.1. Rational
The results of the quantitative analysis produce findings that lack of context. While a trend
over time can be shown to be statistically significant, further questions involving question of ‘why’
cannot be answered. Using the results of the quantitative analysis, a ‘typical’ case, however, can be
identified. A case study of ‘typical’ accidents provides contextualization and helps to explain why the
observed quantitative results exist. While a perfectly ‘average’ case would be ideal (embodying all
modes), finding such as case is unrealistic. Even a study of “the average man” [32], with normally
distributed anthropometry characteristics allowing average to mean within 0.3 standard deviations,
after 10 characteristics out of 132 [33], there was no “average man” [34]. As such, we consider an
indicative case here; this case is non-fatal, occurred in Europe with a European FSNC operator, during
climb, that was a system component failure non-powerplant, for a twin engine jet aircraft in mass
category 4, and is a general maintenance issue. The case is not Boeing (it is Airbus), not domestic
(it is international), and is to a gear issue. That is, there are 10 ‘average’ or important characteristics
and 3 that are not. The specific case involves a failure to follow Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM)
procedures and an inadvertent aircraft swap by maintenance technicians led to the A319 aircraft,
shortly after take-off, experiencing a detachment of fan cowl doors leading to hydraulic loss, fuel leak,
and an engine fire.
6.2. The Flight
On 24, May 2013 the A319 aircraft departed from Heathrow for Oslo, Norway. As the aircraft
rotated the fan cowl doors on both engines detached. The left engine was not damaged by the resulting
debris; however, the right engine suffered damage from its detaching cowl door (Figure 14a). There
was a subsequent loss of one hydraulic system and fuel also began leaking from the right engine.
The loss of fuel from this engine was such that if the crew had not shut-down the engine on approach
to land, the fuel supply to it would have been exhausted [35].
The crew requested and was cleared to return to Heathrow with an initial PAN call. On approach,
the crew made the decision to shut-down the right engine. Shortly after this decision was made a fire
warning for the right engine sounded. The crew’s response to this warning was to, “quickly shut down
the right engine and discharged the first fire extinguisher bottle” [35]. A mayday call was made and
after the required wait time, the second fire bottle was fired into the right engine.
After landing and coming to a halt on the runway, ATC informed the flight crew that there were
flames visible in the right engine. Fire services arrived quickly to the aircraft and commenced fighting
the fire, and an initial decision was made not to evacuate the aircraft. However, this was quickly
changed to a request for the left engine to be shut down and a cabin to be evacuated from the left side
of the aircraft. This resulted in no fatal or serious injuries to crew or passengers [35].
6.3. Maintenance of the Accident Aircraft
The aircraft had been inspected by two maintenance technicians, through the night, prior to the
accident flight. One of the required tasks was to lift the fan cowl doors and inspect the oil level of the
integrated drive generator (IDG). The inspection revealed the oil for the IDG on each engine needed
to be replenished. As the technicians did not have the requisite equipment or oil for this task they
decided to continue to complete the checks for the aircraft, move to inspect other aircraft, and return to
the accident aircraft later in the shift after they had retrieved the correct equipment and oil.
In contravention of the AMM procedures, the technicians lowered the fan cowl doors and left
them “open, resting on the hold-open device (depicted in Figure 14b). (With the) hook re-engaged
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with the latch handle, (therefore the) cowling (was) not locked” [35]. In effect, the cowl doors were like
the Grand Old Duke of York’s men, neither up on telescopic struts nor down and locked, rather they
were held somewhere in between. The technicians saw this as a common practice, albeit one that was
not in the promulgated procedures. The investigators found that other technicians in the company saw
this as a common practice. The rationale was that by leaving the doors open it was a hazard to staff.
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infrequent occurrence” (p. 78) [35]. In having the correct plan of returning to the accident aircraft to
complete the service but incorrectly carrying out the plan by going to the wrong aircraft the technicians
unsafe act was a slip, rather than a mistake [39]. The outcome of the normalized changes to promulgated
procedures when opening cowl doors, along with the aircraft swap error was that the accident aircraft
was dispatched to service with the cowl doors still on the hold-open device and not fully latched.
6.6. Active Failures and Latent Conditions
Reason’s [39] first description and illustration of the now ubiquitous “Swiss-Cheese” model,
had five “planes”. These planes were defenses against accidents occurring. The first four planes did
not have holes through them. The last two planes interacted with local events and along with the
limited window of opportunity afforded by a hole in the last planes an accident could occur. A further
refinement by Reason of his model was published in 1997. He saw that to understand accidents there
needed to be three elements, hazards, defenses, and loses. The defenses had latent conditions arising
from organization factors as well as local workplace factors.
The defenses the accident organization has in place against an event such as the cowl doors
not being fully latched involved a member of the flight crew and a ground crew worker conducting
separate visual checks of the aircraft including the latching devices. Unfortunately, workplace failures
punched holes in this localized defense. Neither the co-pilot on his walk around inspection nor the tug
driver on his inspection noticed the locking devices protruding below the cowls. The latent condition
that contributed to the lack of visual recognition of the unsafe condition of the cowl doors was the
positioning of the latching devices being close to the ground and not easy to see. To visually check
these devices, the workers were required to be on hands and knees on the ground [35], an option that
obviously did not appeal to the co-pilot or tug driver.
One of the ‘planes’ in Reason’s (1990) original iteration of the Swiss Cheese model was labeled
“fallible decisions”, Kourousis, et al. [40] identified the increased defenses the manufacturer of the A32X
series of aircraft inserted into the safety system in the aftermath to this accident in an effort to reduce
or eliminate the occurrences of cowl doors not being fully latched at take-off. Mandated modifications
included new hardware and new procedures. However, the authors noted the potential latent failings
that could arise from these newly implemented modifications [40]. These latent conditions arising
from fallible decisions made by people who are not proximal to the accident may hinder or even




For RQ1 we note that on average aircraft maintenance contributes to (2.8 ± 0.9%) of all accidents.
This rate appears to be showing a slight but statistically significant decrease with time, which if it was to
continue suggests in 20 years maintenance could consistently contribute to no accidents; although this
is an ambition statement being well outside the predictive capability of this simple longitudinal analysis.
Of these maintenance accidents, the properties of note are the prevalence of general maintenance issues,
such as inadequate maintenance and slips and lapses (like those associated with failing to latch engine
cowls). The small number of AD/SB and previous damage accidents suggests when mandatory and
completed, maintenance activities are effective in ensuring an aircraft is safe and airworthy. Looking at
the systems involved, it was noted that issues with the landing gear accounted for almost half (47%) of
cases; of these, 60% were due to structural/physical issues (not hydraulic or electrical issues). This is
not surprising given the large mechanical loads placed on the landing gear.
There are a number of interesting characteristics of accidents with maintenance contributions
relative to all ICAO official accidents. While the fatalness was slightly higher, 20% relative to 14.7%,
this difference was not statistically significant. In terms of world regions, there was no statistically
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significant difference for the region of operator. However, for the region of the occurrence, there is
a statistically significant difference. This is driven by a spike in accidents in the Middle East and
South/Latin America, and a lower than expected count in North America. For phase of flight, a spike of
engine related maintenance issues during initial climb resulted in a statistically significantly different
distribution, one of which is further highlighted in the case study presented. The results for occurrence
categories are as expected; an excess of system component failures, and a lack of ‘environment’ related
occurrences. Of note here is that runway related occurrences are as expected. In terms of aircraft
properties (number of engines, type of engine, and MTOW), there was no difference between accidents
with maintenance contributions and all ICAO official accidents. However, for the manufacturer,
the relatively accident free Ilyushin aircraft showed a spike in accidents with maintenance contributions
that resulted in a statistically significant difference in the distribution of accidents by manufacturer.
The final aircraft property considered was age, the results for which suggest that an aircraft between
10 and 20 years old is more likely to have an accident with a maintenance contribution, and very old
aircraft (those over 30 years) were the least observed to be involved in accidents with maintenance
contributions. In terms of the commercial operation and operator, there was no statistically significant
difference for the operator, but domestic scheduled services did show a statistically significant count,
again likely due to the volume of domestic traffic.
In response to RQ3, it is noted that all accident counts reduced over the period of the study.
The relatively significant reduction of accidents with maintenance contributions since 2008 is promising.
The fact that these accidents have reduced ‘faster’ than ‘average’ is also promising. Finally for RQ4,
it was noted that while accidents with maintenance contributions occur less often as an aircraft becomes
older (given older aircraft are less likely to be utilized in commercial air transport for economic reasons),
the outcomes of those limited accidents tends to be worse, with the odds of both a fatal outcome and
the aircraft being written-off increasing with age.
The undertaken case study highlights that maintenance issues are not exclusively an issue
of budget conscious LCCs in commercial air transport, operating third tier aircraft. The fact that
an indicative case involves a legacy airline (British Airways), and one of the two work horses of
high capacity narrow body operations (Airbus A32X), highlights that maintenance can contribute to
accidents across the aviation industry. The case also highlights that simple slips and lapses can result
in an accident at great cost to the operator. So while significant improvements were implemented in
the 1990s, there is still a lot of work that needs to be done to eliminate maintenance contributions to
accidents in scheduled commercial air transport, and if not eliminate, consistently result in zero cases
per year.
7.2. Assumptions and Limitations
The key limitation of this work is the small size of the data set. There is limited statistical power
associated with small data sets. Of note here is the just statistically significant result of the odds
of a fatality based on aircraft age. A larger dataset would help to either confirm of disprove this.
Similarly, the data set size has influenced the trend in percentage of maintenance accidents over time,
with significant ‘noise’ in the last three years.
It could also be argued that the lack of information about incidents, which are far more common
than accidents, is a limitation. It should, however, be noted that accidents result in significant damage
or injury, even hull loss or death, unlike incidents. As such, research in accidents is arguably more
important in aviation safety.
The use of uniform expected distributions for some of the categorical variables is also a limitation.
For the maintenance issue and the systems/components involved the goal is to simply assess if one
of these is statistically speaking more likely than the others. In contrast, for the operator (business
model) and operation (type of service), these would benefit from a non-uniform expected distribution.
With time and effort, these codes could be created for all 1277 accidents in the ICAO official dataset.
The additional insight gained from this could be useful or limited.
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It would be ideal to analyze the dataset looking for covariances between the categorical variables
considered. This would ideally help identify latent classes in the data (combinations of variable values
that are more likely to occur together, and hence present a greater safety risk, e.g., an Ilyushin cargo
aircraft in the Middle East). However, the limited number of accidents with maintenance contributions
means that performing cross tabulations for these would result in such small counts that the associated
Fisher’s exact test would likely yield no statistically significant results.
7.3. Future Work
Future work will utilize all the collated maintenance accidents from the ASN database (of
which there are approximately 360, spanning 1940 to 2019), to see if all accidents with maintenance
contributions are different to those captured in the official ICAO accident dataset. This will also require
a comparison to the ASN dataset as a population, rather than the ICAO dataset. This will enable all of
the properties in this study to be expanded beyond the scheduled commercial large transport category
aircraft operations captured by the ICAO official accident statistics. Many of the limitations will be
overcome with this larger data set, presenting even further opportunities for future work.
The other follow up question that remains unanswered is the proportion of incidents with
a maintenance contribution or causation. The hypothesis is that a much higher percentage of
incidents could be the result of maintenance issues, which are rectified before they become accidents.
Many readers will have experienced either personally or professionally a delay at the gate because
of ‘technical issues’. While maintenance personnel are clearly fixing technical issues, the topic of
this work demonstrates that they also cause other technical issues, but how many? To answer this
question requires an all-encompassing dataset with narrative information available to search for
maintenance issues.
8. Conclusions
This work has investigated official ICAO accidents with maintenance contributions. The use of an
exploratory research design enabled interesting features of these accidents to be identified (during
the qualitative phase) and studied further (in the quantitative phase) to understand how the values
of these variables are distributed and vary relative to all accidents. Maintenance was found to have
contributed to approximately 3% of all accidents and resulted in slightly more accidents with a fatality
(at least 1); that is, 20% of accidents with maintenance contributions ended with a fatality, while in the
ICAO official accident data, only 15% were fatal. Relative to all accidents, the number of accidents
with maintenance contributions was also found to be reducing at a greater rate over the 12-year span
of the data used in this study. That is, accidents with maintenance contributions are reducing at a rate
of 5% per year, while the rate at which all accidents is reducing is 2% per year. Finally, the effect of
aircraft age was quantified. Accidents with maintenance contributions typically occur with an age
of 10 to 20 years, and an average age of 19 years. Based on age, the outcome of the accident for crew
and passengers (in terms of fatalness) and for the aircraft (in terms of a hull loss) were more likely
to end badly. Specifically, for whether or not the aircraft was written off (damaged beyond repair),
there was a significant trend showing that even odds occurred at 18 years; that is if an aircraft is older
than 18 years when in an accident it is more likely than not to be written-off. For fatalness, even odds
occurred at an age of 34 years, which means that if the aircraft involved in the accident was more than
34 years old, it was more likely than not to involve a fatality.
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